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Abstract
We specify an information flow analysis for a simple imperative language, using a Hoare-like logic. The logic facilitates static
checking of a larger class of programs than can be checked by extant type-based approaches in which a program is deemed insecure
when it contains an insecure subprogram. The logic is based on an abstract interpretation of a “prelude” semantics which makes
independence between program variables explicit. Unlike other, more precise, approaches based on Hoare logics, our approach
does not require a theorem prover to generate invariants. We demonstrate the modularity of our approach by showing that a frame
rule holds in our logic. Finally, we show how our logic can be applied to a program transformation, namely, forward slicing: given
a derivation of a program in the logic, with the information that variable l is independent of variable h, the slicing transformation
systematically creates the forward l-slice of the program: the slice contains all the commands independent of h. We show that the
slicing transformation is semantics preserving.
c© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Abstract interpretation; Denotational semantics; Frame rule; Hoare logic; Information flow analysis; Program slicing; Strongest
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1. Introduction
This article specifies an information flow analysis using a Hoare-like logic and considers an application of the logic
to forward slicing in simple imperative programs.
Given a system with high, or secret (H), and low, or public (L) inputs and outputs, where L ≤ H is a security
lattice, a classic security problem is how to enforce the following end-to-end confidentiality policy: protect secret
data, i.e., prevent leaks of secrets at public output channels. An information flow analysis checks if a program satisfies
the policy. Denning and Denning [14] were the first to formulate an information flow analysis for confidentiality.
Subsequent advances have been comprehensively summarized in the recent survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [30]. An
oft-used approach for specifying static analyses for information flow is security type systems [26,34,33]. Security
types can be assigned to program variables and expressions annotated with security levels. Security typing rules
prevent leaks of secret information to public channels. For example, the security typing rule for assignment prevents
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H data from being assigned to a L variable. A well-typed program “protects secrets”, i.e., no information flows from
H to L during program execution.
In the security literature, “protects secrets” is formalized as noninterference [16] and is described in terms of an
“indistinguishability” relation on states. Two program states are indistinguishable for L if they agree on values of L
variables. The noninterference property says that any two runs of a program starting from two initial states that are
indistinguishable for L, yield two final states that are indistinguishable for L. The two initial states may differ on values
of H variables but not on values of L variables; the two final states must agree on the current values of L variables.
One reading of the noninterference property is as a form of independence [10]: L output is independent of H inputs.
It is this notion of independence that is made explicit in the information flow analysis specified in this article.
A shortcoming of usual type-based approaches for information flow [6,17,27,34] is that a type system can be
too imprecise. Consider the sequential program l := h ; l := 0, where l has type L and h has type H. Although a
programmer would never write such a program, it may arise naturally as a result of program transformation. The
program is rejected by a security type system on account of the first assignment. But the program obviously satisfies
noninterference — final states of any two runs of the program will always have the same value, 0, for l and are thus
indistinguishable for L. Similarly, the program h := l ; l := h is secure, yet is rejected by a security type system.
How can we admit such programs? Our inspiration comes from abstract interpretation [11], which can be viewed
as a method for statically computing approximations of program invariants [12]. A benefit of this view is that the
static abstraction of a program invariant can be used to annotate a program with preconditions and postconditions
and the annotated program can be checked against a Hoare-like logic. In information flow analysis, the invariant of
interest is independence, for which we use the notation [x n w] to denote that x is independent of variable w. The
intuition is this: a command denotes a prelude transformer (formalized in Section 2) that transforms a pre-prelude
(i.e., a prelude before execution of the command) to a post-prelude (i.e., a prelude after execution of the command).
A prelude, in turn, is a store transformer, that transforms an initial store to either a current store or⊥ where⊥ denotes
nontermination. If x is a variable, then [x n w] holds for a prelude T provided for any two initial stores that differ
only on the value of w, if T transforms them into current stores that are non-⊥ then the current stores agree on the
value of x. Alternatively, if x is ⊥, then [⊥ n w] holds for T provided for any two initial stores that differ only on the
value of w, if T transforms them into two current stores then the one store is ⊥ if and only if the other store is. The
intuition above is just a convenient restatement of noninterference but we tie it to the static notion of independence.
Our approach statically computes finite abstractions of the concrete preludes before and after the execution of a
command. The notation T # will be used to describe an abstraction of a concrete prelude T . This is formalized in
Section 3. We formulate (in Section 4) a Hoare-like logic for checking independences and show (Section 5) that
a checked program satisfies noninterference. The assertion language of the logic is decidable since it is just the
language of finite sets of independences with subset inclusion. Specifications in the logic have the form {T #0} C {T
#}.
Given precondition T #, we show in Section 7 how to compute strongest postconditions; for programs with loops, this
necessitates a fixpoint computation.1 The logic deems the program l := h; l := 0 secure (Example 4.1); the strongest
postcondition of the program contains the independence [l n h].
Our approach falls in between type-based analysis and full verification. In the latter, verification conditions for
loops depend on loop invariants generated by a theorem prover, typically using a fixpoint computation. Also in our
setting, a fixpoint computation is employed to approximate loop invariants; these are lightweight in the sense that
they do not put any constraints on the actual values of the program variables. Our approach is modular and we show
that our logic satisfies a frame rule (Section 8). The frame rule permits local reasoning about a program: the relevant
independences for a program are only those [x n w] where x occurs in the program. Moreover, in a larger context,
the frame rule allows the following inference (in analogy with [24]): start with a specification {T #0} C {T
#} describing
independences before and after store modifications; then, {T #0 ∪ T #1} C {T # ∪ T #1} holds provided C does not modify
any variable y where [y n w] appears in T #1. The initial specification {T #0} C {T #}, can reason with only the slice of
store that C touches.
Contributions. To summarize, this article makes three contributions. First and foremost, we formulate information
flow analysis in a logical form via a Hoare-like logic. The approach deems more programs secure than extant
1 The set of independences is a finite lattice, hence the fixpoint computation will terminate.
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For partial correctness – i.e., when we do not care about nontermination – we define, for x 6= ⊥:
s1
x
= s2 ⇐⇒ ((s1 6= ⊥∧ s2 6= ⊥)⇒ s1 x = s2 x)
For total correctness – i.e., when we are interested in nontermination – we additionally define, for x = ⊥:
s1
x
= s2 ⇐⇒ (s1 = ⊥ ⇐⇒ s2 = ⊥)
Fig. 1. When are two stores equal on x?
type-based approaches. In Section 9, we show how our logic conservatively extends the security type system of
Smith and Volpano [34], by showing that any well-typed program in their system satisfies the invariant [l n h].
Secondly, we describe the relationship between information flow and program dependence, explored in [1,18], in
a more direct manner by computing independences between program variables. The independences themselves are
static descriptions of the noninterference property. The development in this article considers nontermination sensitive
noninterference: we assume that an attacker can observe nontermination. Finally, in Section 6, we show an application
of our logic to forward slicing. Given a derivation of a program in the logic, with the information that variable l is
independent of variable h, the slicing transformation systematically creates the forward l-slice of the program: the
slice contains all the commands independent of h. We show that the slicing transformation is semantics preserving.
2. Language: Syntax, preludes, semantics
This section gives the syntax of a simple imperative language, formalizes the notion of preludes, and gives the
semantics of the language in terms of preludes.
Syntax. We consider a simple imperative language with assignment, sequencing, conditionals and loops as formalized
by the following BNF. Commands C ∈ Cmd are given by the syntax
C ::= x := E | C1 ;C2 | if E then C1 else C2 | while E do C
where Var is an infinite set of variables, x, y, z,w ∈ Var range over variables, and where E ∈ Exp ranges over
expressions. Expressions are left unspecified but we shall assume the existence of a function fv(E) that computes
the free variables of expression E. For commands, fv(C) is defined in the obvious way. We also define a function
modified : Cmd→ P(Var) that given a command, returns the set of variables potentially assigned to by the command.
modified(x := E) = {x}
modified(C1 ;C2) = modified(C1) ∪ modified(C2)
modified(if E then C1 else C2) = modified(C1) ∪ modified(C2)
modified(while E do C) = modified(C).
In our examples, we shall often use a skip command; the formal treatment of that command (w.r.t. the semantics
and the logic) should be obvious and we shall not bother to write down the rules explicitly.
Stores. A store, s ∈ Sto, associates each variable with its current value; here values v ∈ Val are yet unspecified but
we assume that there exists a predicate true? on Val. (For instance, we could have Val as the set of integers and let
true?(v) be defined as v 6= 0.) The following notation is used to denote a store update:
• [s | y 7→v] returns a store s ′ with the property: for all x ∈ Var, if x 6= y then s ′ x = s x; but s ′(y) = v.
Stores s1, s2 ∈ Sto⊥ agree on x ∈ Var ∪ {⊥}, written, s1 x= s2, when either of the following conditions hold:
(a) s1, s2, x are all non-⊥ and then s1 x = s2 x; (b) x 6= ⊥ and either s1 = ⊥ or s2 = ⊥ (or both); (c) x = ⊥ and
then s1 = ⊥ if and only if s2 = ⊥. This is made precise in Fig. 1 and motivated shortly in Section 3. Note that for
s1, s2 ∈ Sto and x ∈ Var, s1 x= s2 amounts to s1 x = s2 x.
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We write s1 =w s2, where s1, s2 ∈ Sto and w ∈ Var, to denote that for all variables y 6= w, s1 y = s2 y holds.
That is, the values of all variables, except of w, are equal in stores s1 and s2.
Preludes. A prelude,2 T ∈ Prelude, maps an initial store to either a current store or ⊥, where ⊥ denotes
nontermination. Thus Prelude = Sto→ Sto⊥. Note that Sto⊥ is a complete partial order (CPO) with the ordering v
defined as: s1 v s2 iff either s1 = ⊥ or s1 equals s2. Thus Prelude is a CPO, under the pointwise ordering: T1 v T2
iff for all s ∈ Sto, T1 s v T2 s.
Semantics. For expressions, we assume there exists a semantic function [[E]] : Sto→ Val which satisfies the following
property:
Property 2.1. If for all x ∈ fv(E) we have s1 x = s2 x, with s1, s2 ∈ Sto, then [[E]]s1 = [[E]]s2.
The definition of [[E]] would contain the clause [[x]]s = s x. The semantics of a command has functionality
[[C]] : Prelude → Prelude, and is defined in Fig. 2. To streamline the treatment of ⊥, the metalanguage expression
“let α = β in . . .” denotes ⊥ if β is ⊥.
Observe that since Prelude is a CPO also Prelude → Prelude is a CPO, with the following pointwise ordering:
f1 v f2 iff f1(T) v f2(T) for all T ∈ Prelude. Let C be of the form while E do C0, and let F be the corresponding
function (called the functor of the while command) as defined in Fig. 2. The following calculation shows that F is
continuous on Prelude→ Prelude.
F(unionsqifi) = λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in (if true?([[E]]s ′) then (unionsqifi)([[C0]]T)s else s ′)
= λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in (if true?([[E]]s ′) then unionsqi (fi([[C0]]T)s) else s ′)
= unionsqi(λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in (if true?([[E]]s ′) then fi([[C0]]T)s else s ′)
= unionsqi(F(fi)).
Hence the least fixpoint of F is indeed well-defined, and




where fi (called an iterand of the while command) is defined by:
f0 = λT.λs.⊥
fi+1 = F(fi).
Fact 2.2. Let C be a while command, with {fi} the iterands of C. Then for all T ∈ Prelude and s ∈ Sto there exists j0
such that for all j ≥ j0 we have fj T s = [[C]]T s.
The intuition behind having a prelude semantics is as follows: Independences, as to be defined in Section 3, are
with respect to the initial state of the whole computation. So to provide the meaning of a program fragment, we
want to consider how a prelude (i.e., a function that describes how the state before execution of a command is
reached from an initial state) is mapped to another (i.e., a function that describes how the state after execution of
the command is reached from the initial state). For a concrete example, consider the computation of the program
x := x+ y ;y := x+ 1 in an initial state that maps x to 0 and y to 2.
• Under a standard semantics, after execution of x := x+ y, the new state maps x to 2 and leaves y unchanged. After
execution of y := x+ 1, the new state maps y to 3 and leaves x unchanged.
• In the prelude semantics, we have the following situation. Suppose the effect of executing x := x+ y is the prelude
that maps the initial state [x = 0, y = 2] to the state [x = 2, y = 2]. Then the effect of executing y := x+ 1 under
this prelude is a new prelude that maps the initial state [x = 0, y = 2] to the state [x = 2, y = 3].
Next some technical results about the semantic functions.
2 We have learned from Dave Schmidt that the nomenclature is due to Bob Tennent.
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[[x := E]] = λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in [s ′ | x 7→ [[E]]s ′]
[[C1 ;C2]] = λT.[[C2]]([[C1]]T)
[[if E then C1 else C2]] = λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in
if true?([[E]]s ′) then [[C1]]T s else [[C2]]T s
[[while E do C0]] = lfp(F) where
F : → (Prelude→ Prelude)
(Prelude→ Prelude) is given by
F(f) = λT.λs.let s ′ = T s in
if true?([[E]]s ′) then f([[C0]]T)s else s ′
Fig. 2. The Prelude semantics.
Definition 2.3. We say that a function f ∈ Prelude → Prelude is fully strict if for all T ∈ Prelude and s ∈ Sto,
T s = ⊥ implies f T s = ⊥.
We say that a fully strict function f preserves z ∈ Var if whenever f T s 6= ⊥ (and thus T s 6= ⊥) then
f T s z = T s z.
Fact 2.4. For all commands C, the function [[C]] is monotone and fully strict. Also, all iterands fi of while commands
are monotone and fully strict.
Proof. We go by structural induction on C. For while, we show that F maps monotone functions into monotone
functions and fully strict functions into fully strict functions; the result then follows (as f0 is clearly monotone and
fully strict) since the limit of monotone functions is itself monotone, and the limit of fully strict functions is itself fully
strict. 
Lemma 2.5. For all commands C, and all z ∈ Var with z /∈ modified(C),
• [[C]] preserves z;
• if C is a while command then all its iterands fi preserve z.
Proof. Structural induction in C, with a case analysis. In all cases we are given T and s, and assume that [[C]]T s 6= ⊥
(and by Fact 2.4 thus T s 6= ⊥); we must show that [[C]]T s z = T s z.
C = x := E. From z /∈ modified(C) we infer that z 6= x, and the claim is trivial.
C = C1 ;C2. Since z /∈ modified(C2), we infer inductively that [[C2]]([[C1]]T) s z = [[C1]]T s z. Since z /∈
modified(C1), we infer inductively that [[C1]]T s z = T s z. We thus get [[C]]T s z = [[C2]]([[C1]]T) s z = T s z, as
desired.
C = if E then C1 else C2. Here, w.l.o.g. we can assume that true?([[E]](T s)), in which case [[C]]T s z = [[C1]]T s z.
Since z /∈ modified(C1), we infer inductively that [[C1]]T s z = T s z. This yields the claim.
C = while E do C0. Let fi be the iterands of C; our first task is to prove by induction in i that each fi preserves z.
For i = 0, the claim follows vacuously since fi T s = ⊥. For the inductive case, we split into two cases, in both cases
assuming fi+1 T s 6= ⊥ (and by Fact 2.4 thus T s 6= ⊥):
• if true?([[E]](T s)) then
fi+1 T s z = fi([[C0]]T) s z = [[C0]]T s z = T s z
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis on fi, and the third equality follows from the
overall induction hypothesis on C0 (applicable since z /∈ modified(C0)).
• if true?([[E]](T s)) does not hold, then fi+1 T s z = T s z follows directly.
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We are left with showing that also [[C]], given as the least upper bound of the iterands, preserves z. But since
[[C]]T s 6= ⊥, we infer from Fact 2.2 that there exists a natural number j such that [[C]]T s = fj T s, yielding the
desired [[C]]T s z = fj T s z = T s z. 
3. Independences
The prelude semantics says that the meaning of a command is a prelude transformer: it transforms initial preludes
into current preludes. In this section we will be interested in a finite abstraction of the preludes relevant to the
execution of a command. The abstract preludes are termed independences: an independence T # ∈ Independ =
P((Var ∪ {⊥})× Var) is a set of pairs of the form [x n w]. If x is a variable, then [x n w] denotes that the current
value of x is independent of the initial value of w. If x is ⊥, then nontermination, i.e., whether control reaches the
current program point, is independent of w. This is formalized by the following definition which states the condition
under which an independence correctly describes a concrete prelude.
Definition 3.1. For all T ∈ Prelude, for all x ∈ Var ∪ {⊥}, for all w ∈ Var, T |= [x n w] holds iff for all
s1, s2 ∈ Sto: s1 =w s2 implies T s1
x
= T s2.
T |= T # holds iff for all [x n w] ∈ T # it holds that T |= [x n w].
In the definition of T |= [x n w], note that s1, s2 are the “initial” stores and the antecedent of the implication asserts
that these stores are equal except forw. The “current” stores are obtained via T s1 and T s2 and the consequent of the
implication demands that the current stores be equal on x. Because x can be ⊥, and because of the way [⊥ n w] is
defined, an analysis based on Definition 3.1 is nontermination sensitive. In particular, observe the following result:
Fact 3.2. Assume that T |= {[x n w], [⊥ n w]}. Then for all s1, s2 ∈ Sto, s1 =ws2 implies that either T s1 = T s2 =⊥, or T s1 6= ⊥ and T s2 6= ⊥ with T s1 x = T s2 x.
Definition 3.3. The ordering T #1  T #2 holds iff T #2 ⊆ T #1.
The intuition behind the definition is that in T #1  T #2, T #1 is more precise than T #2 because T #1 deems more variables
independent than T #2. A motivation for the definition is the desire for a subtyping rule, stating that if T
#
1  T #2 then T #1
can be replaced by T #2 (cf. Fact 3.4). The subtyping rule is sound provided T
#
2 is a subset of T
#
1 and therefore obtainable
from T #1 by removing information.
Clearly, Independ forms a complete lattice w.r.t. the ordering ; let uiT #i denote the greatest lower bound (which
is the set union). The greatest element is the empty set of independences and the least element is Independ; the least
element is obtained when all variables have constant values. We have some expected properties, where Fact 3.4 is
used in the proof of the correctness theorem (Section 5), and where Fact 3.5 follows since if [x n w] belongs to uiT #i
then it also belongs to some T #i .
Fact 3.4. If T |= T #1 and T
#
1  T #2 then T |= T #2.
Fact 3.5. If for all i ∈ I it holds that T |= T #i , then T |= ui∈IT #i .
We have the following fact about the identity prelude.
Fact 3.6. For all x ∈ Var ∪ {⊥}, for all y ∈ Var, if x 6= y then λs.s |= [x n y].
An abstract interpretation. Facts 3.4 and 3.5 lead us to explore the connection of our framework with abstract
interpretation [11]. We can write a function γ : Independ→ P(Prelude):
γ(T #) = {T ∈ Prelude | T |= T #}
and demonstrate that γ is completely multiplicative. We calculate:
T ∈ γ(uiT #i) ⇔ ∀[x n y] ∈ uiT #i • T |= [x n y]⇔ ∀i • ∀[x n y] ∈ T #i • T |= [x n y]⇔ ∀i • T ∈ γ(T #i )⇔ T ∈⋂
i
γ(T #i ).
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Therefore, γ can be considered a concretization function so that, by properties of Galois connections, e.g., [23, Lemma
4.23], there exists an abstraction function α : P(Prelude)→ Independ:
α(U) =
⋃
{T # | U ⊆ γ(T #)}
such that (P(Prelude), α, γ, Independ) is a Galois connection.
Equivalently, Facts 3.4 and 3.5 state that relation |= is U-closed (upwards closed) and G-closed (greatest lower
bound closed) respectively. Therefore, (see, e.g., [32]) |= defines a Galois connection. It follows that by defining
γ(T #) as above, we have the properties:
• γ is a monotone function.
• For all T # ∈ Independ, for all U ∈ P(Prelude), U ⊆ γ(T #) iff α(U)  T #.
The second item above is the definition of a Galois connection and in this sense, |= “is” a Galois connection.
4. Static checking of independences
To statically check independences we define, in Fig. 3, a Hoare-like logic where judgements are of the form
G ` {T #0} C {T #}
The judgement is interpreted as saying that if the independences in T #0 hold before execution of C then the
independences in T # will hold after execution of C. The context G ∈ Context = P(Var) is a control
dependence, denoting (a superset of) the variables that at least one test surrounding C depends on. For example,
in if x then y := 0 else z := 1, the static checking of y := 0 takes place in the context that contains all variables that x
is dependent on. This is crucial, especially since x may depend on a high variable.
We now explain a few of the rules in Fig. 3. Checking an assignment, x := E, in context G, involves checking any
[y n w] in the postcondition T #. There are two cases. If x 6= y, then [y n w] must also appear in the precondition
T #0. Likewise, if [⊥ n w] appears in the postcondition T #, then it must also appear in the precondition T #0. Otherwise,
if x = y then [x n w] appears in the postcondition provided all variables referenced in E are independent of w;
moreover, w must not appear in G, as otherwise, x would be control dependent on w.
Checking a conditional, if E then C1 else C2, involves checking C1 and C2 in a context G0 that includes not
only the “old” context G but also the variables that E depends on (as variables modified in C1 or C2 will be control
dependent on the variables that E depends on). Equivalently, if w is not in G0, then all free variables x in E must be
independent of w, that is, [x n w] must appear in the precondition T #0.
Checking a while loop is similar to checking a conditional. The only difference is that it requires guessing
an “invariant” T # that is both the precondition and the postcondition of the loop and its body. With respect to
nontermination, note that if w ∈ G0 then w may influence the termination of the program: either directly, as in
while w > 7 do w := w+ 1 (where the side condition for [While] forces w to be added to G0); or indirectly, as in
ifw > 7 then skip else while true do skip (where the side condition for [If] has already addedw to G). Therefore we
demand that if [⊥ n w] ∈ T # then w must not be in G0.
In Section 7, when we define strongest postcondition, we will selectG0 = G∪{w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #0} for
the conditional and the while loop. Instead of guessing the invariant, we will show how to compute it using fixpoints.
Example 4.1 (Illustrating “Recovery” of Independences). We have the derivations
∅ ` {{[l n h], [h n l]}} l := h {{[h n l], [l n l]}} and
∅ ` {{[h n l], [l n l]}} l := 0 {{[h n l], [l n l], [l n h]}}
and therefore also
∅ ` {{[l n h], [h n l]}} l := h ; l := 0 {{[h n l], [l n l], [l n h]}}.
With the intuition that l stands for “low” or “public” and h stands for “high” or “sensitive”, the derivation asserts
that if l is independent of h before execution, then l is independent of h after execution. Thus [l n h] is an invariant
of the computation. By Definition 3.1, any prelude of the program applied to initial stores that differ only in the value
for h, creates new stores that agree on the current value for l. Thus the program is secure, although it contains an
insecure sub-program: the independence [l n h] is lost after l := h, but recovered after l := 0.
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[Assign] G ` {T #0} x := E {T #}
if ∀[y n w] ∈ T #•
(x 6= y∨ y = ⊥)⇒ [y n w] ∈ T #0
x = y⇒ (w /∈ G∧ ∀z ∈ fv(E) • [z n w] ∈ T #0)
[Seq]
G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1} G ` {T #1} C2 {T #2}
G ` {T #0} C1 ;C2 {T #2}
[If]
G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #} G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}
G ` {T #0} if E then C1 else C2 {T #}
if G ⊆ G0 ∧
(w /∈ G0 ⇒
∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #0)
[While]
G0 ` {T #} C {T #}
G ` {T #} while E do C {T #}
if G ⊆ G0 ∧
(w /∈ G0 ⇒
∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #) ∧
([⊥ n w] ∈ T # ⇒ w 6∈ G0)
[Sub]
G1 ` {T #1} C {T #2}
G0 ` {T #0} C {T #3}
if (T #0  T #1)∧ (T #2  T #3)∧ (G0 ⊆ G1)
Fig. 3. The logic.
Example 4.2 (Illustrating Control Dependence). The reader may check that the following informally annotated
program gives rise to a derivation in our logic. Initially, G is empty, and all variables are pairwise independent;
we write [x n y, z] to abbreviate [x n y], [x n z].
{[l n h, x], [h n l, x], [x n l, h]}
x := h {[l n h, x], [h n l, x], [x n l, x]}
if x > 0 (G is now {h})
then l := 7 {[l n x, l], [h n l, x], [x n l, x]}
else x := 0 {[l n h, x], [h n l, x], [x n l, x]}
end of if {[l n x], [h n l, x], [x n l, x]}
A few remarks:
• in the preamble, only x is assigned, so the independences for l and h are carried through, but [x n l, x] holds
afterwards, as [h n l, x] holds beforehand;
• the free variable in the guard is independent of l and x but not of h, implying that h has to be in G.
Example 4.3 (Illustrating How the Logic Works with Nontermination). With P = while l 6= 0 do h := 7 and T # =
{[⊥ n h], [l n h]} we have the judgement ∅ ` {T #} P {T #} (since {l} ` {T #} h := 7 {T #}) showing that P is deemed
secure by our logic; an observer able to observe even nontermination cannot detect the initial value of h. (The reason
why [h n l] and [⊥ n l] are not in T # is that h clearly depends on l and nontermination depends on l.)
However, with P = while h 6= 0 do h := 7 and T # = {[⊥ n h], [l n h], [h n l]}we do not have a derivation, even
though T # is an invariant for h := 7. But because the derivation requires h ∈ G0, [⊥ n h] can no longer be in T #. This
suggests that P is insecure when nontermination is observable: indeed, an observer able to observe nontermination can
detect whether hwas initially 0 or not. Interestingly, if nontermination is not observable, then T # = {[l n h], [h n l]}
remains invariant, as expected. In particular, the current value of l is independent of the initial value of h. Similarly,
we do not have a derivation for P = if h 6= 0 then skip else while true do skip with T # containing [⊥ n h].
A couple of simple results can be proven about the logic in Fig. 3:
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Fact 4.4. Assume G ` {T #0} C {T #}. If [⊥ n w] ∈ T # then [⊥ n w] ∈ T #0.
The proof is an easy induction on a derivation of G ` {T #0} C {T #}.
Lemma 4.5. Assume G ` {T #0} C {T #} with [⊥ n w] ∈ T # and w ∈ G. Then T s 6= ⊥ implies [[C]]T s 6= ⊥.
Proof. An easy induction in the derivation, where for [Seq] we use Fact 4.4; for [While] the result follows vacuously
since having both [⊥ n w] ∈ T # and w ∈ G violates the side conditions of that rule. 
To restate Fact 4.4, if [⊥ n w] 6∈ T #0, then [⊥ n w] cannot be recovered in T #. This is in contrast to Example 4.1,
which shows that although [l n h] does not appear in the precondition of l := 0, it could nonetheless be recovered in
the postcondition of l := 0. In other words, once it is established that nontermination may depend on w, it continues
to depend on w. This is what we should expect, as otherwise, with w interpreted “high”, nontermination can be used
to leak the high value.
In a judgement G ` {T #0} C {T #}, suppose w ∈ G. This means that any assignment in C is control dependent on
w. Suppose now that y is a variable and is independent of w in the postcondition T #. This implies that y cannot be
assigned to in C — otherwise, it would be dependent on w. If y is not assigned to in C, then y must be independent
ofw in the precondition too. These intuitions are collected together in Lemma 4.6 below. Note that with y interpreted
as “low” and w as “high”, the lemma essentially says that low variables may not be written to under a high guard.
Thus the lemma is the counterpart of the “no write down” rule that underlies information flow control; the term
“*-property” [8] is also used. The value of low variables remains the same after execution of C.
Lemma 4.6 (Write Confinement). Assume that G ` {T #0} C {T #}. Then the following holds:
If [y n w] ∈ T # and y ∈ Var and w ∈ G
then y /∈ modified(C) and [y n w] ∈ T #0.
Proof. We perform induction in the derivation of G ` {T #0} C {T #}, and do a case analysis on the last rule applied:
[Assign], with C = x := E. If x = y, then w /∈ G, contradicting our assumptions. If x 6= y, then y /∈ modified(C)
and [y n w] ∈ T #0.
[Seq], with C = C1 ;C2. Assume that G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1} and G ` {T #1} C2 {T #} and also assume that w ∈ G. By
applying the induction hypothesis to the latter judgement, we see that y /∈ modified(C2) and that [y n w] ∈ T #1. By
then applying the induction hypothesis to the former judgement, we see that y /∈ modified(C1) and that [y n w] ∈ T #0.
Therefore y /∈ modified(C), as desired.
[If], with C = if E then C1 else C2. Assume that
G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #} and G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}
where G ⊆ G0. Let [y n w] ∈ T # with w ∈ G, then w ∈ G0 so by applying the induction hypothesis we get
y /∈ modified(C1) and y /∈ modified(C2) and [y n w] ∈ T #0. This implies y /∈ modified(C), and thereby the desired
result.
[While], with C = while E do C0. Our assumptions are that G ` {T #} C {T #} because with G ⊆ G0 we have
G0 ` {T #} C0 {T #}. Let [y n w] ∈ T # with w ∈ G, then w ∈ G0 so by applying the induction hypothesis we
get y /∈ modified(C0) (and trivially [y n w] ∈ T #) which is as desired.
[Sub]. Assume that G ` {T #0} C {T #} because with G ⊆ G0 and T #0  T #1 and T #2  T # we have G0 ` {T #1} C {T #2}.
Also assume that [y n w] ∈ T # and that w ∈ G. Then [y n w] ∈ T #2 and w ∈ G0, so inductively we obtain
y /∈ modified(C) and [y n w] ∈ T #1. Then also [y n w] ∈ T #0, as desired. 
5. Correctness
We are now in a position to prove the correctness of the logic with respect to the prelude semantics.
Theorem 5.1. Assume that
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G ` {T #0} C {T #} where for all [x n y] ∈ T #0 it is the case that x 6= y. Then [[C]](λs.s) |= T #.
That is, T # correctly describes the concrete prelude obtained by executing command C on λs.s, the initial prelude.
The correctness theorem can be seen as the noninterference theorem for information flow. Indeed, consider the
prelude, T , obtained from executing the command C with the initial prelude, λs.s. With l and h interpreted as “low”
and “high” respectively, suppose [l n h] appears in T #. Then for any two stores s1, s2 that differ only on h, the stores
T s1 and T s2 must agree on the value of l, meaning that if both T s1 and T s2 terminate then they must not give
different values for l. On the other hand, it is possible for either T s1 or T s2 or both to be ⊥, as in the example
if h then h := 7 else (while true do skip)
which has [l n h] as an invariant.
Moreover, the correctness theorem says that if [⊥ n h] appears in T #, then T s1 = ⊥ iff T s2 = ⊥: thus
noninterference is preserved under nontermination.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we need the following main lemma. Then the theorem follows by substituting T by λs.s,
and then using Fact 3.6.
Lemma 5.2. If G ` {T #0} C {T #} and T |= T #0, then [[C]]T |= T #.
Proof. We perform induction on a derivation of G ` {T #0} C {T #}, and do a case analysis on the last rule applied.
[Assign], with C = x := E. We are given [z n w] ∈ T #, and we consider s1, s2 ∈ Sto such that s1 =w s2. With
T ′ = [[C]]T , we must show that T ′ s1
z
= T ′ s2.
If z = ⊥, then [z n w] ∈ T #0, so T s1 ⊥= T s2. Since for all s, T ′ s = ⊥ iff T s = ⊥, this shows that also
T ′ s1
⊥
= T ′ s2, as desired.
So now consider z ∈ Var. If either T s1 = ⊥ or T s2 = ⊥, also T ′ s1 = ⊥ or T ′ s2 = ⊥, and the claim is trivial.
We thus assume that T s1 6= ⊥ and T s2 6= ⊥. We have two subcases:
(1) z 6= x: Then [z n w] ∈ T #0, so T s1 z= T s2, that is, T s1 z = T s2 z. Since for all s we have T ′ s z = T s z, this
shows that also T ′ s1 z = T ′ s2 z, as desired.
(2) z = x: Then for all y ∈ fv(E), we have [y n w] ∈ T #0 and therefore T s1 y = T s2 y. By Property 2.1 then
[[E]](T s1) = [[E]](T s2), showing that T ′ s1 x = T ′ s2 x, as desired.
[Seq], with C = C1 ;C2. Assume that
G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1} and that G ` {T #1} C2 {T #2}.
By applying the induction hypothesis to the first judgement, we get
[[C1]](T) |= T #1.
We then apply the induction hypothesis to the second judgement and get the desired result:
[[C2]]([[C1]](T)) |= T #.
[If], with C = if E then C1 else C2. Assume that
G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #} and G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}
where w /∈ G0 implies that ∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #0. Inductively, we can assume that [[C1]]T |= T # and
[[C2]]T |= T #. We are given [z n w] ∈ T # (where zmight be⊥), and we consider s1, s2 ∈ Sto such that s1 =w s2. With
T ′ = [[C]]T , we must show that T ′ s1
z
= T ′ s2.
First assume that at least one of T s1 or T s2 is ⊥. By Fact 2.4, at least as many of T ′ s1 and T ′ s2 will be ⊥. So if
z ∈ Var, then trivially T ′ s1 z= T ′ s2. If z = ⊥, then by Fact 4.4 we know that [⊥ n w] ∈ T #0, so from T |= T #0 we
get T s1
⊥
= T s2 and therefore T s1 = T s2 = ⊥. But then also T ′ s1 = T ′ s2 = ⊥, showing T ′ s1 ⊥= T ′ s2.
We can thus assume that there exists stores s ′1, s
′
2 6= ⊥ such that s ′1 = T s1 and s ′2 = T s2. Apart from symmetry,
there are two cases:
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true?([[E]]s ′1) and true?([[E]]s
′
2). Then T
′ s1 = [[C1]]T s1 and T ′ s2 = [[C1]]T s2. From [[C1]]T |= T # and [znw] ∈ T #
we infer that [[C1]]T s1
z
= [[C1]]T s2, which amounts to the desired T ′ s1
z
= T ′ s2.




and prove the claim by contradiction: suppose w 6∈ G0. Then by the logic, for all x ∈ fv(E), [x n w] ∈ T #0 implying
T s1
x
= T s2, that is s ′1(x) = s
′




2 — a contradiction.
Having established w ∈ G0, consider two cases. First assume z = ⊥. Then (by Lemma 4.5 applied to the sub-
derivations) we infer that [[C1]]T s1 6= ⊥ and [[C2]]T s2 6= ⊥, and thus T ′ s1 6= ⊥ and T ′ s2 6= ⊥. But this yields the
desired relation T ′ s1
⊥
= T ′ s2.
Now assume that z ∈ Var. By Lemma 4.6 applied to the sub-derivations, we infer that
[z n w] ∈ T #0 and z 6∈ modified(C1) and z 6∈ modified(C2).
Since T |= T #0, this shows T s1
z
= T s2, that is, T s1 z = T s2 z. We know that T ′ s1 = [[C1]]T s1
and T ′ s2 = [[C2]]T s2. If either is ⊥, the claim vacuously holds; so assume neither is ⊥. By Lemma 2.5,
T s1 z = [[C1]]T s1 z and T s2 z = [[C2]]T s2 z. This shows the desired T ′ s1 z = T s1 z = T s2 z = T ′ s2 z.
[While], with C = while E do C0. Our assumptions are that
G ` {T #} C {T #}
because with G0 such that w /∈ G0 implies that ∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #, and such that [⊥ n w] ∈ T # implies
w /∈ G0, we have
G0 ` {T #} C0 {T #}.
We define an auxiliary predicate P:
P(f)⇔ ∀T • (T |= T # ⇒ f T |= T #)
We shall establish
∀i ≥ 0 • P(fi) (1)
and do so by induction in i. For the base case, note that f0(T) = λs.⊥, and that λs.⊥ |= T # always holds because no
matter whether z = ⊥ or not, ⊥ z= ⊥.
For the inductive case, we assume that T |= T # and must prove F f T |= T #, with f an iterand. So let [z n w] ∈ T #
and s1 =w s2; we know that T s1
z
= T s2 and must prove F f T s1 z= F f T s2.
First assume that at least one of T s1 or T s2 is⊥. By Fact 2.4, at least as many ofF f T s1 andF f T s2 will be⊥.
So if z ∈ Var, then triviallyF f T s1 z= F f T s2. If z = ⊥, then from [⊥ n w] ∈ T # and T |= T # we get T s1 ⊥= T s2
and therefore T s1 = T s2 = ⊥. But then also F f T s1 = F f t s2 = ⊥, showing F f T s1 ⊥= F f T s2.
We can thus assume that there exists stores s ′1, s
′
2 6= ⊥ such that s ′1 = T s1 and s ′2 = T s2. Apart from symmetry,
there are three cases:
true?([[E]]s ′1) and true?([[E]]s
′
2). Then F f T s1 = f([[C0]]T)s1 and F f T s2 = f([[C0]]T)s2. By applying the overall
induction hypothesis on G0 ` {T #} C0 {T #}, we get [[C0]]T |= T #; by applying the innermost induction hypothesis,
we then get f[[C0]]T |= T #, so that f([[C0]]T)s1
z
= f([[C0]]T)s2 which amounts to the desired F f T s1 z= F f T s2.
not true?([[E]]s ′1) and not true?([[E]]s
′
2). Then F f T s1 = T s1 and F f T s2 = T s2, and the claim is trivial.
true?([[E]]s ′1) but not true?([[E]]s
′
2). If w 6∈ G0, then by the logic, for all x ∈ fv(E), [x n w] ∈ T # implying
T s1
x
= T s2, that is s ′1(x) = s
′




2 — a contradiction. Thus w ∈ G0.
Since [z n w] ∈ T #, we infer from the logic that z 6= ⊥. Thus, z is a variable.
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By Lemma 4.6 (applied to the sub-derivation), we infer that z 6∈ modified(C0). We know that F f T s1 =
f([[C0]]T)s1 and F f T s2 = T s2. We can assume that F f T s1 6= ⊥, as otherwise the claim vacuously holds. By
Lemma 2.5, [[C0]]T s1 z = T s1 z, and, by the same lemma, f([[C0]]T) s1 z = [[C0]]T s1 z. So we have the desired
relation:
F f T s1 z = f([[C0]]T)s1 z = T s1 z = T s2 z = F f T s2 z.
We have proved (1). We must now prove P([[C]]), that is P(unionsqifi). So assume that T |= T # and that [z n w] ∈ T #
and that s1 =w s2; we must prove that [[C]]T s1
z
= [[C]]T s2. By Fact 2.2, there exists j such that [[C]]T s1 = fj T s1 and
[[C]]T s2 = fj T s2. The claim now follows from (1).
[Sub]. Assume that
G ` {T #0} C {T #}
because with G ⊆ G0 and T #0  T #1 and T #2  T # we have
G0 ` {T #1} C {T #2}.
From our assumption T |= T #0 we infer by Fact 3.4 that T |= T
#
1, so inductively we can assume that [[C]]T |= T
#
2. One
more application of Fact 3.4 then yields the desired result. 
6. An application of the logic: Forward slicing
In this section we shall see how to compute the “low” forward slice of a program P. That is, we focus on one
particular “high” variable h, and eliminate all commands in P that may depend on h, yielding a “slice” P ′. With
l1 . . . ln the variables not depending on h in P (and thus considered “low”), our aim is that P ′ should be equivalent
to P on l1 . . . ln. Then a user, wanting to compute the low variables but (for security reasons) not given clearance to
view h, could be given P ′ to run, rather than P.
The slicing function S is defined in Fig. 4, inductively on derivations in the logic (Fig. 3). The idea is to replace by
skip (i) assignments to variables that may depend on h; (ii) conditionals and loops whose test may depend on h.
With s1, s2 ∈ Sto⊥, we write s1 T
#
= s2 to denote that s1
z
= s2 holds for all z ∈ Var ∪ {⊥} such that [z n h] ∈ T #.
We can now formulate correctness of slicing:
Theorem 6.1. LetD be a derivation for the judgementG ` {T #0} C {T #}, and let S(D) = C ′. Then [[C]]T s T
#
= [[C ′]]T s.
In particular, if T # = {[l n h], [⊥ n h]} we can infer that either [[C]]T s and [[C ′]]T s are both ⊥, or they are both 6= ⊥
and agree on l.
On the other hand, if T # contains only [l n h] we can infer only partial correctness; it may happen that [[C]]T s = ⊥
but [[C ′]]T s 6= ⊥. For an example of that, consider the program while h > 0 do skip; it can be given a derivation
{h} ` {{[l n h], [h n l]}} skip {{[l n h], [h n l]}}
∅ ` {{[l n h], [h n l]}} while h > 0 do skip {{[l n h], [h n l]}}
which by S is transformed into skip.
Theorem 6.1 follows immediately from the following main lemma, facilitating a proof by induction.
Lemma 6.2. Let D be a derivation for the judgement G ` {T #0} C {T #}, and let S(D) = C ′.
If T1 s
T #0
= T2 s then [[C]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
Proof. Induction in the derivation, where in all cases, we can assume that
T1 s 6= ⊥ and T2 s 6= ⊥.
For if that is not the case, then (by Fact 2.4) we have [[C]]T1 s = ⊥ or [[C ′]]T2 s = ⊥. We would therefore have
the desired relation [[C]]T1 s
z
= [[C ′]]T2 s for all z ∈ Var, but must still consider the case [⊥ n h] ∈ T #. Then by
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[Assign] G ` {T #0} x := E {T #} ⇒{
x := E, if [x n h] ∈ T #
skip, if [x n h] 6∈ T #
[Seq]
D1︷ ︸︸ ︷
G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1}
D2︷ ︸︸ ︷
G ` {T #1} C2 {T #2}




G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #}
D2︷ ︸︸ ︷
G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}
G ` {T #0} if E then C1 else C2 {T #}
⇒{
if E then S(D1) else S(D2), if h 6∈ G0
skip, if h ∈ G0
[While]
D0︷ ︸︸ ︷
G0 ` {T #} C {T #}
G ` {T #} while E do C {T #} ⇒{
while E do S(D0), if h 6∈ G0
skip, if h ∈ G0
[Sub]
D0︷ ︸︸ ︷
G1 ` {T #1} C {T #2}
G0 ` {T #0} C {T #3}
⇒ S(D0)
Fig. 4. Forward slicing: The slicing function S.
Fact 4.4 we infer that [⊥ n h] ∈ T #0 and therefore T1 s ⊥= T2 s implying T1 s = T2 s = ⊥; by Fact 2.4 this implies
[[C]]T1 s = [[C
′]]T2 s = ⊥ and therefore the desired relation [[C]]T1 s ⊥= [[C ′]]T2 s.
We now embark on a case analysis.
[Assign]. Given [z n h] ∈ T #, we must show
[[C]]T1 s
z
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
If z = ⊥, the claim is trivial, since [[C]]T1 s 6= ⊥ and [[C ′]]T2 s 6= ⊥. So assume that z 6= ⊥.
If z 6= x, then [z n h] ∈ T #0, implying T1 s z = T2 s z. So no matter whether C ′ is x := E or skip, we have the
desired equality
[[C]]T1 s z = T1 s z = T2 s z = [[C
′]]T2 s z.
Now assume that z = x, in which case Fig. 4 tells us that C ′ = C, and where the side conditions from Fig. 3 tell us
that for all y ∈ fv(E), [y n h] ∈ T #0 and thus T1 s y = T2 s y. Therefore, using Property 2.1, [[E]](T1 s) = [[E]](T2 s).
Again we therefore get the desired equality
[[C]]T1 s z = [[E]](T1 s) = [[E]](T2 s) = [[C
′]]T2 s z.
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[Seq]. Assume that with C of the form C1 ;C2, the derivation D of G ` {T #0} C {T #} has two children: a derivation
D1 of a judgement G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1}, and a derivation D2 of a judgement G ` {T #1} C2 {T #}. With C ′1 = S(D1) and
C ′2 = S(D2), we have C ′ = S(D) = C ′1 ;C ′2.
Inductively on D1, we from T1 s
T #0
= T2 s infer [[C1]]T1 s
T #1





1]]T2) s which amounts to the desired equality [[C]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
[Sub]. Assume that the derivationD ofG ` {T #0} C {T #} has as child a derivationD0 of a judgementG0 ` {T #1} C {T #2},
where G ⊆ G0 and T #0  T #1 and T #2  T #. Here C ′ = S(D) = S(D0). Our assumption T1 s
T #0
= T2 s clearly implies
T1 s
T #1
= T2 s (as T #1 ⊆ T #0); inductively on D0 we can thus infer that [[C]]T1 s
T #2
= [[C ′]]T2 s which (as T # ⊆ T #2) implies
the desired equality [[C]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
[If]. Assume that with C of the form if E then C1 else C2, the derivation D of G ` {T #0} C {T #} has two children:
a derivation D1 of a judgement G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #}, and a derivation D2 of a judgement G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}. Let
C ′1 = S(D1), and C ′2 = S(D2). Looking at Fig. 4, we see that there are two subcases:
C ′ = if E then C ′1 else C
′
2, with h /∈ G0. The side condition in Fig. 3 tells us that for all x ∈ fv(E) it holds that
[x n h] ∈ T #0 and thus T1 s x = T2 s x. Therefore, using Property 2.1, [[E]](T1 s) = [[E]](T2 s); we can assume w.l.o.g.
that this value satisfies true?. Thus [[C]]T1 s = [[C1]]T1 s and [[C ′]]T2 s = [[C ′1]]T2 s; this amounts to the desired
equality [[C]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′]]T2 s since inductively on D1 we infer that [[C1]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′1]]T2 s.
C ′ = skip, with h ∈ G0. Let [z n h] ∈ T # be given; we must show that
[[C]]T1 s
z
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
If z = ⊥, Lemma 4.5 (applied to D1 and D2) tells us that [[C1]]T1 s 6= ⊥ and [[C2]]T1 s 6= ⊥; thus [[C]]T1 s 6= ⊥,
yielding the claim (since trivially, [[C ′]]T2 s 6= ⊥).
We thus now assume that z ∈ Var; from Lemma 4.6 (applied to D1 and D2) we then infer that
• z /∈ modified(C1) and z /∈ modified(C2), and therefore z /∈ modified(C) which by Lemma 2.5 implies that [[C]]
preserves z;
• [z n h] ∈ T #0, implying that T1 s z = T2 s z.
If [[C]]T1 s = ⊥, the claim is trivial; otherwise we from the above infer the desired equality:
[[C]]T1 s z = T1 s z = T2 s z = [[C
′]]T2 s z.
[While]. Assume that with C of the form while E do C0, and with T #0 = T
#, the derivation D of G ` {T #0} C {T #} has
one child: a derivation D0 of a judgement G0 ` {T #} C0 {T #}. Let C ′0 = S(D0). Looking at Fig. 4, we see that there
are two subcases:
C ′ = while E do C ′0, with h /∈ G0. Let F be the functor of C, let F ′ be the functor of C ′, let fi (i ≥ 0) be the iterands
of C, and let f ′i (i ≥ 0) be the iterands of C ′. We shall prove by induction in i that
for all T1, T2, s: T1 s
T #
= T2 s implies fi T1 s
T #
= f ′i T2 s. (1)
In all cases, we can assume that T1 s 6= ⊥ and T2 s 6= ⊥. For if that is not the case, then (by Fact 2.4) we have
fi T1 s = ⊥ or f ′i T2 s = ⊥, which would imply the desired judgement, except if [⊥ n h] ∈ T # in which case we




For i = 0, the claim is obvious, since ⊥ T #= ⊥ always holds. Now consider the inductive step, where we must
prove that T1 s
T #
= T2 s implies F fi T1 s T
#
= F ′ f ′i T2 s. Since h /∈ G0, the side condition in Fig. 3 tells us that for all
x ∈ fv(E) it holds that [x n h] ∈ T # and thus T1 s x = T2 s x. Therefore, using Property 2.1, [[E]](T1 s) = [[E]](T2 s).
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If this value does not satisfy true?, then F fi T1 s = T1 s and F ′ f ′i T2 s = T2 s, trivially implying the claim.
Otherwise, our task is to prove that
fi ([[C0]]T1) s
T #
= f ′i ([[C
′
0]]T2) s.
By applying the overall induction hypothesis on D0, we infer that [[C0]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′0]]T2 s; the claim then follows by
applying the innermost induction hypothesis.
We can now return to our main task, proving that [[C]]T1 s
T #
= [[C ′]]T2 s (where we are given that T1 s
T #0
= T2 s). But
by Fact 2.2 there exists j such that [[C]]T1 s = fj T1 s and [[C ′]]T2 s = f ′j T2 s; therefore (1) yields the claim.
C ′ = skip, with h ∈ G0. Let [z n h] ∈ T # be given; we must show that
[[C]]T1 s
z
= [[C ′]]T2 s.
The side condition in Fig. 3 tells us that z ∈ Var; from Lemma 4.6 (applied to D0) we then infer that z /∈
modified(C0) = modified(C) which by Lemma 2.5 implies that [[C]] preserves z. If [[C]]T1 s = ⊥, the claim is
trivial; otherwise, the desired equality follows from the calculation
[[C]]T1 s z = T1 s z = T2 s z = [[C
′]]T2 s z
where the second equality follows from [z n h] ∈ T #. 
Example 6.3 (Illustrating Forward Slicing). For the program l := h ; l := 0, the forward slice is skip ; l := 0, because
we lose the independence [l n h] after l := h. For the program h := l ; l := h, the forward slice is h := l ; l := h itself,
since we retain the independence [l n h] after each of the commands in the sequence, and since the first command
establishes the independence [h n h].
7. Computing independences
In Fig. 5 we define a function
sp : Context× Cmd× Independ→ Independ
with the intuition (formalized below) that given a control dependence G, a command C and a precondition T #,
sp(G,C, T #) computes a postcondition T #1 such that G ` {T #} C {T #1} holds, and T #1 is the “largest” set (w.r.t. the
subset ordering) that makes the judgement hold. Thus we compute the “strongest provable postcondition”, which
might differ3 from the strongest semantic postcondition, that is, the largest set T #1 such that for all T , if T |= T
# then
[[C]](T) |= T #1.
In a companion technical report [3, Appendix A], we show how to also compute “weakest precondition”; we
conjecture that the development in Section 8 could alternatively be carried out using weakest precondition instead of
strongest postcondition.
We now explain two of the cases in Fig. 5. In an assignment, x := E, the postcondition carries over all independences
[y n w] in the precondition if y 6= x; these independences are unaffected by the assignment to x. Suppose that w
does not occur in context G. Then x is not control dependent on w. Moreover, if all variables referenced in E are
independent of w, then [x n w] will be in the postcondition of the assignment.
The case for while is best explained by means of an example.
Example 7.1. Consider the program
C = n := 0 ;while y > n do l := x ; x := y ;y := h ;n := n+ 1.
3 For example, let C = l := h− h and T# = {[l n h]}. Then [l n h] is in the strongest semantic postcondition, since for all T and all s1, s2
we have [[C]]T s1
l
= [[C]]T s2 and therefore [[C]]T |= [l n h], but not in the strongest provable postcondition.
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Let T #0 . . . T
#
12 be given by the following table, where V denotes the set {h, l, n, x, y}. For reasons of space, we will
represent a non-empty set as the concatenation of its elements in the table — thus {h, l, n, x} is represented as hlnx.
For example, the entry in the column for T #6 and in the row for x shows that [x n h] ∈ T #6 and [x n l] ∈ T #6 and


























h n lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy lnxy
n n hlxy V V V V hlnx hlnx hlnx hlnx lnx lnx lnx lnx
l n hnxy hnxy hln hln hln hln hn ln ln ln n ln ln
x n hlny hlny hlny hlnx hlnx hlnx hln hln lnx lnx ln ln lnx
y n hlnx hlnx hlnx hlnx lnx lnx lnx lnx lnx lnx lnx lnx lnx
⊥ n V V V V V V hlnx hlnx hlnx hlnx lnx lnx lnx
Our goal is to compute sp(∅, C, T #0) and doing so involves the fixpoint computation sketched below.
Iteration
First Second Third





G0 : {y} {h, y} {h, y}




















∩ T #1 \ [⊥ n G0] T #6 T #10 T #10
For example, the entry T #9 in the column marked “second” and in the row marked “n := n+ 1”, denotes that
sp({h, y}, n := n+ 1, T #8) = T
#
9.
Note that at the end of the first iteration, the independence set is T #6 and [l n h] is still present; it takes a second
iteration – the independence set is then T #10 – to filter [l n h] out and thus detect insecurity. The third iteration affirms
that T #10 is indeed a fixpoint (of the functionalH
T #1,∅
while defined in Fig. 5).
Theorem 7.3 states the correctness of the function sp, that it indeed computes a postcondition. Then, Theorem 7.4
states that the postcondition computed by sp is the strongest postcondition. We shall rely on the following property:
Lemma 7.2 (Monotonicity). For all commands C, the following holds (for all G,G1,T #,T #1):
(1) sp(G,C, T #) is well-defined;
(2) HT #,GC (when C is a while loop) is a monotone function;
(3) if G ⊆ G1 then sp(G,C, T #)  sp(G1, C, T #);
(4) if T #  T #1 then sp(G,C, T #)  sp(G,C, T #1).
Proof. Induction in C, where the four parts of the lemma are proved simultaneously. We do a case analysis on C; the
only non-trivial case is where C is of the form while E do C0.
Using the induction hypothesis on C0, we infer that for all T #0, G it holds thatH
T #0,G
C is a monotone function on the
complete lattice Independ. Hence lfp(HT #0,GC ), and thus sp(G,C, T #0), is indeed well-defined.
Next assume that T #  T #1 and that G ⊆ G1. Then clearly HT #,GC  HT
#
1,G1
C (by the pointwise ordering) and
therefore lfp(HT #,GC )  lfp(HT
#
1,G1
C ) which amounts to the desired relation sp(G,C, T
#)  sp(G1, C, T #1). 
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sp(G, x := E, T #0) =
{[y n w] | (y 6= x∨ y = ⊥)∧ [y n w] ∈ T #0}∪ {[x n w] | w /∈ G∧ ∀y ∈ fv(E) • [y n w] ∈ T #0}
sp(G,C1 ;C2, T #0) = sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T
#
0))
sp(G, if E then C1 else C2, T #0) =
let G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #0}
T #1 = sp(G0, C1, T
#
0)
T #2 = sp(G0, C2, T
#
0)
in T #1 ∩ T #2
sp(G,while E do C0, T #0) =
let HT #0,GC : Independ→ Independ be given by (C = while E do C0)
HT #0,GC (T #) =
let G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #}
in (sp(G0, C0, T #) ∩ T #0) \ {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G0}
in lfp(HT #0,GC )
Fig. 5. Strongest postcondition.
Theorem 7.3. For all C, G, T #0, it holds that G ` {T #0} C {sp(G,C, T #0)}.
Proof. Go by structural induction on C; we perform a case analysis.
C = x := E. Let T # = sp(G,C, T #0), and assume [z n w] ∈ T #. There are two cases:
• if z 6= x then [z n w] ∈ T #0.• if z = x then w /∈ G, and ∀y ∈ fv(E) • [y n w] ∈ T #0.
This establishes G ` {T #0} C {T #}.
C = C1 ;C2. Assume that sp(G,C1 ;C2, T #0) = T
# because T # = sp(G,C2, T #1) where T
#
1 = sp(G,C1, T
#
0). By the
induction hypothesis on C1 and on C2, we have
G ` {T #0} C1 {T #1} and G ` {T #1} C2 {T #}
from which we infer the desired relation G ` {T #0} C1 ;C2 {T #}.
C = if E then C1 else C2. Assume that sp(G, if E then C1 else C2, T #0) = T
# because G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈
fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #0}, T #1 = sp(G0, C1, T #0) and T #2 = sp(G0, C2, T #0) and T # = T #1 ∩ T #2. Inductively, we have
G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #1} and G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #2}.
As T # ⊆ T #1 and T # ⊆ T #2 we have T #1  T # and T #2  T #; by [Sub], this implies
G0 ` {T #0} C1 {T #} and G0 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}.
This establishes the desired G ` {T #0} if E then C1 else C2 {T #}, since G ⊆ G0 and w /∈ G0 implies ∀x ∈
fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #0.
C = while E do C0. Assume that sp(G,C, T #0) = T




By definition of a fixpoint, T # = HT #0,GC (T #). Thus
T # = (sp(G0, C0, T #) ∩ T #0) \ {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G0}
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whereG0 = G∪{w | ∃x ∈ fv(E)•[xnw] /∈ T #}. Hence sp(G0, C0, T #)  T # and T #0  T #. We claimG ` {T #} C {T #},
which by [Sub] implies the desired G ` {T #0} C {T #}.
It remains to prove the claim, G ` {T #} C {T #}. By the induction hypothesis on C0 we have G0 `
{T #} C0 {sp(G0, C0, T #)} and by [Sub] therefore
G0 ` {T #} C0 {T #}.
Now we get G ` {T #} C {T #} by an application of [While] because G ⊆ G0, because w /∈ G0 implies
∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #, and because if w ∈ G0 then [⊥ n w] /∈ T #. 
Theorem 7.4. For all judgements G ` {T #0} C {T #}, sp(G,C, T #0)  T #.
Proof. We perform induction in the derivation of G ` {T #0} C {T #}, and do a case analysis on the last rule applied:
[Sub]. Assume that G ` {T #0} C {T #} because with G ⊆ G1 and T #0  T #2 and T #3  T # we have G1 ` {T #2} C {T #3}.
Applying the induction hypothesis on that derivation, we get
sp(G1, C, T #2)  T #3
and by Lemma 7.2 we get sp(G,C, T #0)  sp(G1, C, T #2). This yields the desired relation
sp(G,C, T #0)  T #3  T #.
[Assign], with C = x := E. Assume thatG ` {T #0} C {T #}, and let T #1 = sp(G,C, T #0). We want T #1  T #. Accordingly,
assume [y n w] ∈ T # to show [y n w] ∈ T #1. We have two cases:
• x 6= y. Then [y n w] ∈ T #0; hence [y n w] ∈ T #1 by the definition of sp.
• x = y. Then w /∈ G and ∀z ∈ fv(E) • [z n w] ∈ T #0; hence [y n w] ∈ T #1 by the definition of sp.
[Seq], with C = C1 ;C2. Assume G ` {T #0} C {T #} because G ` {T #0} C1 {T #2} and G ` {T #2} C2 {T #}. By the
induction hypothesis on these derivations,
sp(G,C1, T #0)  T #2 and sp(G,C2, T #2)  T #
which by Lemma 7.2 enables us to infer that
sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T #0))  T #.
This is as desired, since sp(G,C1 ;C2, T #0) = sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T
#
0)).
[If], with C = if E then C1 else C2. Assume thatG ` {T #0} C {T #} becauseG1 ` {T #0} C1 {T #} andG1 ` {T #0} C2 {T #}
where G ⊆ G1 and where w /∈ G1 implies that ∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #0. Inductively, via the judgements for C1
and C2, we obtain
sp(G1, C1, T #0)  T # and sp(G1, C2, T #0)  T #.
Let G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #0}. Note that G0 ⊆ G1. Thus by Lemma 7.2 we get
sp(G0, C1, T #0)  T # and sp(G0, C2, T #0)  T #.
This yields the claim since sp(G,C, T #0) = sp(G0, C1, T
#
0) ∩ sp(G0, C2, T #0).
[While], with C = while E do C0. Assume that G ` {T #} C {T #} because G1 ` {T #} C0 {T #} where G ⊆ G1, and
where w /∈ G1 implies that ∀x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] ∈ T #, and where [⊥ n w] ∈ T # implies w /∈ G1. Assume T #1 =
sp(G,C, T #) to show T #1  T #. By the definition of sp, T #1 = lfp(HT #,GC ). LetG0 = G∪{w | ∃x ∈ fv(E)•[xnw] /∈ T #};
then
HT #,GC (T #) = (sp(G0, C0, T #) ∩ T #) \ {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G0}
⊇ (sp(G1, C0, T #) ∩ T #) \ {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G1} = T #
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Here the set inclusion follows from the observation that G0 ⊆ G1 and an application of Lemma 7.2; the last equality
follows since w ∈ G1 implies [⊥ n w] /∈ T #, and since the induction hypothesis tells us that sp(G1, C0, T #)  T #.
This shows that HT #,GC is reductive at T #, that is HT
#,G
C (T
#)  T #, so by Tarski’s theorem we infer the desired
relation T #1 = lfp(HT
#,G
C )  T #. 
The following result, where we clearly cannot allow y = ⊥, is useful for the developments in Section 8:
Lemma 7.5. Given C, and y ∈ Var with y /∈ modified(C). Then for all T #0, G, w:
[y n w] ∈ T #0 implies [y n w] ∈ sp(G,C, T #0).
Proof. Go by structural induction on C; we perform a case analysis. In each case, our assumption is that y /∈
modified(C) and that [y n w] ∈ T #0; we must show [y n w] ∈ sp(G,C, T #0).
C = x := E. Our assumptions imply that y 6= x, from which the result trivially follows.
C = C1 ;C2. Since y /∈ modified(C1) we can apply the induction hypothesis on C1, giving us [y n w] ∈
sp(G,C1, T #0). Since y /∈ modified(C2) we can then apply the induction hypothesis on C2, giving us [y n w] ∈
sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T #0)). This yields the claim.
C = if E then C1 else C2. Since y /∈ modified(C1) and y /∈ modified(C2), we can apply the induction hypothesis
twice, yielding (using the terminology in Fig. 5)
[y n w] ∈ T #1 and [y n w] ∈ T #2.
Since sp(G,C, T #0) = T
#
1 ∩ T #2, this yields the claim.
C = while E do C0. Let T # = sp(G,C, T #0), then T
# = lfp(HT #0,GC ). Define
T #1 = T
# ∪ {[y n w]}
and let G0 be as in Fig. 5. By applying the induction hypothesis on C0 (possible since y /∈ modified(C0)) we get
[y n w] ∈ sp(G0, C0, T #1); since [y n w] ∈ T #0 and y 6= ⊥ this implies
[y n w] ∈ HT #0,GC (T #1). (1)









#) = T # and
thus
T # ⊆ HT #0,GC (T #1). (2)









1)  T #1. This shows that HT
#
0,G
C is reductive at T
#
1,
so by Tarski’s theorem we infer T # = lfp(HT #0,GC )  T #1, that is T #1 ⊆ T #. This demonstrates that [y n w] ∈ T #, as
desired. 
8. Modular reasoning and the frame rule
Although we have not emphasized it in this article, it is possible to state the logic in Fig. 3 in a way such that the
judgements for a particular command mention only the variables relevant to the command. In this manner, one may
obtain “small specifications” [24] for every command. For instance, the rule for assignment could be rewritten as:
[Assign] G ` {T #0} x := E {T #}
if ∀[y n w] ∈ T # • (y = x ∧
w /∈ G∧ ∀z ∈ fv(E) • [z n w] ∈ T #0)
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An independence [y n w] with y 6= x is invariant with respect to x := E, since y is not modified, and hence there is
no need to mention it. If it is required in a larger context, as in a sequential composition, it can be retrieved using a
frame rule, as in separation logic [20,28]. The frame rule is motivated by the desire for local reasoning: if C1 and C2
modify disjoint regions of a heap, reasoning about C1 can be performed independently of the reasoning about C2. In
our setting, with lhs(T #) = {y | [y n w] ∈ T #}, we can state the frame rule as
[Frame]
G ` {T #0} C {T #}
G ` {T #0 ∪ T #1} C {T # ∪ T #1}
if modified(C) ∩ lhs(T #1) = ∅
and ⊥ /∈ lhs(T #1).
In the rest of this section, we will show results about modular reasoning in the context of the calculation of strongest
postconditions; this entails (Corollary 8.3) that [Frame] as stated above is indeed admissible. For a development where
the frame rule plays a key roˆle, we refer the interested reader to our more recent work [2].
Theorem 8.1 (Frame Rule (I) ). Given T #0 and C. Then for all T
#, G:
(1) If lhs(T #0) ⊆ Var and lhs(T #0) ∩ modified(C) = ∅
then sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0) ⊇ sp(G,C, T #) ∪ T #0.
(2) If lhs(T #0) ⊆ Var and lhs(T #0) ∩ fv(C) = ∅
then sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0) = sp(G,C, T #) ∪ T #0.
Note that the weaker premise in (1) does not imply the stronger consequence in (2), since (with [z n w] playing the
role of T #0)
sp(∅, x := y+ z, {[y n w]} ∪ {[z n w]}) = {[y n w], [z n w], [x n w]}
sp(∅, x := y+ z, {[y n w]}) ∪ {[z n w]} = {[y n w], [z n w]}.
Theorem 8.1 is proved by observing that part (1) follows from Lemmas 7.5 and 7.2; then part (2) follows using the
following result:
Lemma 8.2. Let T #0 and C be given, with lhs(T
#
0) ⊆ Var and lhs(T #0) ∩ fv(C) = ∅. Then for all T # and G,
sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0) ⊆ sp(G,C, T #) ∪ T #0.
Proof. Go by structural induction on C; we perform a case analysis.
C = x := E. The claim follows from the following calculation, using that lhs(T #0) ∩ fv(E) = ∅ and that x /∈ lhs(T #0).
sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0)
= {[y n w] | y 6= x∧ [y n w] ∈ T # ∪ T #0} ∪
{[x n w] | w /∈ G∧ ∀y ∈ fv(E) • [y n w] ∈ T # ∪ T #0}
= {[y n w] | y 6= x∧ [y n w] ∈ T # ∪ T #0} ∪
{[x n w] | w /∈ G∧ ∀y ∈ fv(E) • [y n w] ∈ T #}
= T #0 ∪ {[y n w] | y 6= x∧ [y n w] ∈ T #} ∪
{[x n w] | w /∈ G∧ ∀y ∈ fv(E) • [y n w] ∈ T #}
= T #0 ∪ sp(G,C, T #).
C = C1 ;C2. Using our induction hypothesis and Lemma 7.2, we get
sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0) = sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T # ∪ T #0))
⊆ sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T #) ∪ T #0) ⊆ sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T #)) ∪ T #0
= sp(G,C, T #) ∪ T #0
C = if E then C1 else C2. Let
G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T # ∪ T #0}
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where our assumptions imply that lhs(T #0) ∩ fv(E) = ∅ and therefore also
G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #}.
Using the induction hypothesis, we now get
sp(G,C, T # ∪ T #0) = sp(G0, C1, T # ∪ T #0) ∩ sp(G0, C2, T # ∪ T #0)
⊆ (sp(G0, C1, T #) ∪ T #0) ∩ (sp(G0, C2, T #) ∪ T #0)
= (sp(G0, C1, T
#) ∩ sp(G0, C2, T #)) ∪ T #0
= sp(G,C, T #) ∪ T #0
C = while E do C0. Let H = HT #,GC and let H0 = H
T #∪T #0,G
C , we must show that lfp(H0) ⊆ lfp(H) ∪ T #0. Define
T #1 = lfp(H0), and let
G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #1 \ T #0}
where our assumptions imply that lhs(T #0) ∩ fv(E) = ∅ and therefore also
G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #1}.
Using Lemma 7.2 and our induction hypothesis on C0 we get (where T #⊥ denotes {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G0})







= ((sp(G0, C0, T
#
1) ∩ (T # ∪ T #0)) \ T #⊥) \ T #0
= (sp(G0, C0, T
#
1) ∩ T #) \ T #0 \ T #⊥
⊆ (sp(G0, C0, (T #1 \ T #0) ∪ T #0) ∩ T #) \ T #0 \ T #⊥
⊆ ((sp(G0, C0, (T #1 \ T #0)) ∪ T #0) ∩ T #) \ T #0 \ T #⊥
⊆ (sp(G0, C0, (T #1 \ T #0)) ∩ T #) \ T #⊥
= H(T #1 \ T
#
0).
We have proved H(T #1 \ T
#
0)  T #1 \ T #0. This shows that H is reductive at T #1 \ T #0, so by Tarski’s theorem we infer
lfp(H)  T #1 \ T #0. This implies the desired relation
lfp(H0) = T #1 ⊆ (T #1 \ T #0) ∪ T #0 ⊆ lfp(H) ∪ T #0. 
As a consequence of Theorem 8.1, we get the following result:
Corollary 8.3 (Frame Rule (II)). Assume that G ` {T #1} C {T #2} and that lhs(T #0) ∩ (modified(C) ∪ {⊥}) = ∅. Then
G ` {T #1 ∪ T #0} C {T #2 ∪ T #0}.
Proof. Using Theorems 8.1 and 7.4 we get
sp(G,C, T #1 ∪ T #0) ⊇ sp(G,C, T #1) ∪ T #0 ⊇ T #2 ∪ T #0.
Since by Theorem 7.3 we have G ` {T #1 ∪ T #0} C {sp(G,C, T #1 ∪ T #0)}, the result follows by [Sub]. 
Example 8.4. Assume that
G ` {T #1} C1 {T #3} and G ` {T #2} C2 {T #4}.
Further assume that lhs(T #2) ∩ (modified(C1) ∪ {⊥}) = ∅ and that lhs(T #3) ∩ (modified(C2) ∪ {⊥}) = ∅. Then
Corollary 8.3 yields
G ` {T #1 ∪ T #2} C1 {T #3 ∪ T #2} and G ` {T #3 ∪ T #2} C2 {T #3 ∪ T #4}
and therefore G ` {T #1 ∪ T #2} C1 ;C2 {T #3 ∪ T #4}.
A traditional view of modularity in the security literature is the “hook-up property” [22]: if two programs are secure
then their composition is secure as well. Our logic satisfies the hook-up property for sequential composition; in our
context, a secure program is one which has [l n h] as an invariant (if [l n h] is in the precondition, it is also in the
strongest postcondition). With this interpretation, Sabelfeld and Sands’s hook-up theorem holds [31, Theorem 5].
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Γ, x : (T, κ) ` E : (T, κ)
Γ, x : (T, κ) ` x := E : (com κ)
Γ ` E : (int, κ) Γ ` C1 : (com κ) Γ ` C2 : (com κ)
Γ ` if E then C1 else C2 : (com κ)
Γ ` C1 : (com κ) Γ ` C2 : (com κ)
Γ ` C1 ;C2 : (com κ)
Γ ` E : (int, κ) Γ ` C : (com κ)
Γ ` while E do C : (com κ)
Γ ` C : (com κ1) κ ≤ κ1
Γ ` C : (com κ)
Fig. 6. The Smith–Volpano type system: Rules for commands.
9. The Smith–Volpano security type system
In the Smith–Volpano type system [34], variables are labeled by security types; for example, x : (T, κ) means
that x has type T and security level κ. The security typing rules are given in Fig. 6. To handle implicit flows due to
conditionals, the technical development requires commands to be typed (com κ) with the intention that all variables
assigned to in such commands have level at least κ. The judgement Γ ` C : (com κ) says that in the security type
context Γ that binds free variables in C to security types, command C has type (com κ).
We now show a conservative extension: if a program is well-typed in the Smith–Volpano system, then for any two
preludes, the current values of low variables are independent of the initial values of high variables. For simplicity, we
consider a program with only two variables, h with level H and l with level L.
Theorem 9.1. Assume that C can be given a security type w.r.t. the environment h : ( , H), l : ( , L). Then for all T #,
if [l n h] ∈ T # then [l n h] ∈ sp(∅, C, T #).
The upshot of the theorem is that a well-typed program has [l n h] as invariant: if [l n h] appears in the precondition,
then it also appears in the strongest postcondition.
The theorem is a straightforward consequence of the following lemma which facilitates a proof by induction. For
L commands, the assumption h 6∈ G in the lemma says that L commands cannot be control dependent on H guards.
Lemma 9.2. (1) Suppose h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C : (com H). Then for all G, T #, if [l n h] ∈ T # then
[l n h] ∈ sp(G,C, T #).
(2) Suppose h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C : (com L). Then for all G, T #, if [l n h] ∈ T # and h 6∈ G then
[l n h] ∈ sp(G,C, T #).
Proof. We prove the two parts of the lemma in turn. In both cases we go by induction on the derivation of C (in the
system of Fig. 6), with cases on the last rule used.
(Part 1)
C = z := E. Clearly, z 6= l as otherwise the assignment cannot be typed. By definition,
sp(G, z := E, T #) ⊇ {[u n w] | u 6= z∧ [u n w] ∈ T #} 3 [l n h].
C = C1 ;C2. We have h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C1 : (com H) and h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C2 : (com H). Inductively, we
get
[l n h] ∈ sp(G,C1, T #) and then [l n h] ∈ sp(G,C2, sp(G,C1, T #)).
Thus [l n h] ∈ sp(G,C1 ;C2, T #).
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C = if E then C1 else C2. Then h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C1 : (com H) and h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C2 : (com H).
Assume [l n h] ∈ T #. Inductively,
[l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C1, T #) and [l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C2, T #)
whereG0 = G∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E)• [x n w] /∈ T #}. Thus [l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C1, T #)∩ sp(G0, C2, T #), and we are done.
C = while E do C0. Then h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C0 : (com H). Let T #0 = sp(G,C, T #). Then T #0 = lfp(HT #,GC ). Hence





Let T #1 = T
#
0 ∪ [l n h]. Now
HT #,GC (T #1) = (sp(G0, C0, T #1) ∩ T #) \ {[⊥ n w] | w ∈ G0}
where G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #1}. Inductively, as [l n h] ∈ T #1, we get [l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C0, T #1).
Thus,
[l n h] ∈ HT #,GC (T #1). (1)
BecauseHT #,GC is a monotone function, from T #1  T #0 we getHT #,GC (T #1)  HT #,GC (T #0) = T #0. Thus
T #0 ⊆ HT #,GC (T #1). (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we get T #1 ⊆ HT #,GC (T #1), i.e., HT #,GC (T #1)  T #1. This shows that HT #,GC is reductive at T #1,
so by Tarski’s theorem, T #0 = lfp(HT
#,G
C )  T #1, that is, T #1 ⊆ T #0. Hence [l n h] ∈ T #0.
Subtyping. For the subtyping rule, the result trivially follows by induction on the smaller derivation tree for C.
This completes Part 1 of the proof.
(Part 2)
Subtyping. Assume [l n h] ∈ T # and h 6∈ G. By the typing rule, h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C : (com L) follows because
h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` C : (com κ1) for some κ1. If κ1 = L, the result follows inductively. If κ1 = H, then we can
apply Part 1 of the theorem to conclude that [l n h] ∈ sp(G,C, T #) holds for any G; in particular, it must therefore
hold for the G where h 6∈ G.
C = z := E. Assume [l n h] ∈ T # and h 6∈ G. By typing, z : ( , L) and h 6∈ fv(E), as otherwise the assignment cannot
be typed. Hence z = l. By definition,4
sp(G, z := E, T #) ⊇ {[z n w] | w /∈ G∧ ∀u ∈ fv(E) • [u n w] ∈ T #}
3 [l n h].
C = C1 ;C2. Easy induction.
C = if E then C1 else C2. By typing, h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` E : (int, L). Hence h 6∈ fv(E) and thus h 6∈ G0,
where G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #}. Then inductively, we obtain [l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C1, T #) and
[l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C2, T #). Hence [l n h] ∈ sp(G0, C1, T #) ∩ sp(G0, C2, T #) = sp(G,C, T #).
C = while E do C0. By typing, h : ( , H), l : ( , L) ` E : (int, L). Hence h 6∈ fv(E). Now the proof proceeds
similarly to the corresponding case in Part 1 and is omitted, except that we note that to use the induction hypothesis
on the derivation of C0, we need to show h 6∈ G0, where G0 = G ∪ {w | ∃x ∈ fv(E) • [x n w] /∈ T #1}. Since
h /∈ G, it is sufficient to show that for all x ∈ fv(E) it holds that [x n h] ∈ T #1. But this follows since h /∈ fv(E) and
[l n h] ∈ T #1. 
4 In case there are several low variables, we would use the argument:
sp(G, z := E, T#) ⊇ {[u n w] | u 6= z∧ [u n w] ∈ T#} 3 [l n h]
to deal with low variables not assigned to.
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10. Discussion
Perspective. This article specifies an information flow analysis for confidentiality using a Hoare-like logic and shows
an application of the analysis to a program transformation, namely, slicing. The concrete pre- and post-preludes of
a program are abstracted by independences. Independences can be statically checked against the logic and can be
statically computed using strongest postconditions. We also show how the notion of independences underlies a classic
type-based information flow analysis due to Smith and Volpano [34].
Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [15] consider attackers as abstract interpretations and generalize the notion of
noninterference by parameterizing it w.r.t. what an attacker can analyze about the input/output information flow.
For instance, assume an attacker can only analyze the parity (odd/even) of values. Then
while h do l := l+ 2 ;h := h− 1
is secure, although it contains an update of a low variable under a high guard. We might try to model this approach in
our framework by parameterizing Definition 3.1 w.r.t. parity, but it is not clear how to alter the proof rules accordingly.
Instead, we envision our logic to be put on top of abstract interpretations. In the parity example, the above program
would be abstracted to
while h do h := h− 1
which our logic already deems secure for an attacker not able to observe nontermination.
Related work. The most closely related work is that of Clark et al. [9], who consider a language similar to ours
and then extend it to Idealized Algol, requiring distinguishing between identifiers and locations. The analysis for
Idealized Algol is split in two stages: the first stage does a control-flow analysis, specified using a flow logic [23]. The
second stage specifies what is an acceptable information flow analysis with respect to the control-flow analysis. The
precision of the control-flow analysis influences the precision of the information flow analysis. Flow logics usually do
not come with a frame rule so it is unclear what modularity properties their analysis satisfies. For each statement S in
the program, they compute the set of dependences introduced by S; a pair (x, y) is in that set if different values for y
prior to execution of S may result in different values for x after execution of S. For a complete program, they thus, as
expected, compute essentially the same information as we do, but the information computed locally is different from
ours: we estimate if different initial values of y, i.e., values of y prior to execution of the whole program, may result
in different values for x after execution of S.
Joshi and Leino [21] provide an elegant semantic characterization of noninterference that allows handling both
termination sensitive and termination insensitive noninterference. Their notion of security for a command C is
equationally characterized by C ;HH = HH ;C ;HH, where HH means that an arbitrary value is assigned to a high
variable. They show how to express their notion of security in Dijkstra’s weakest precondition calculus. Although
they do not consider synthesizing loop invariants, this can certainly be done via a fixpoint computation with weakest
preconditions. However, their work is not concerned with computing dependences.
Darvas et al. [13] use dynamic logic to express secure information flow in JavaCard. They discuss several ways
that noninterference can be expressed in a program logic, one of which is as follows: consider a program with
variables l and h. Consider another copy of the program with l, h relabeled to fresh variables l ′, h ′ respectively.
Then, noninterference holds in the following situation: running the original program and the copy sequentially such
that the initial state satisfies l = l ′ should yield a final state satisfying l = l ′. They are also interested in showing
insecurity, by exhibiting distinct initial values for high variables that give distinct current values of low variables; to
achieve this accuracy, they need the power of a general purpose theorem prover, which is also helpful in that they can
express declassification, as well as treat exceptions (which most approaches based on static analysis cannot easily be
extended to deal with).
Barthe et al. [7] use the same idea of self-composition (i.e., composing a program with a copy of itself) as Darvas
et al. and investigate “abstract” noninterference [15] for several languages. By parameterizing noninterference with a
property, they are able to handle more general information flow policies, including a form of declassification known
as delimited information release [29]. They show how self-composition can be formulated in logics describing these
languages, namely, Hoare logic, separation logic, linear temporal logic, etc. They also discuss how to use their
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results for model checking programs with finite state spaces to check satisfaction of their generalized definition of
noninterference.
The first work that used a Hoare-style semantics to reason about information flowwas by Andrews and Reitman [5].
Their assertions keep track of the security level of variables, and are able to deal even with parallel programs. However,
no formal correctness result is stated.
Differences from the conference version. Apart from the removal of some infelicities of notation, we have made
three additional contributions not present in the conference version of this article [4].
• We consider nontermination sensitive noninterference here, compared to nontermination insensitive
noninterference in the conference version. For that purpose, we needed to add a new kind of independence, which
in turn necessitated changes in the logic — specifically, in the rule for loops.
• To prove the resulting logic semantically correct, the semantics had to be modified, since the one given in [4]
had no explicit notion of nontermination. As an extra benefit, the resulting denotational semantics is significantly
simpler than the previous one.
• We show an application of the logic to forward slicing. Although the connection between information flow analysis
and slicing was explored by Abadi et al. [1], that paper did not provide a means to compute forward slices, which
we present here.
On the other hand, the conference version of this article contained a section on counterexample generation, which we
have chosen to omit here. We feel that the results might merit a separate paper after some strengthening.
Conclusion. The work reported in this article was inspired in part by presentations by Roberto Giacobazzi and Reiner
Ha¨hnle at the Dagstuhl Seminar on Language-based Security (October 2003). The reported work is only the first step
in our goal to formulate more general definitions of noninterference in terms of program independence, such that the
definitions support modular reasoning. We are in the process of extending the framework in this article to handle a
richer language, with methods, pointers, objects and dynamic memory allocation. An obvious goal is interprocedural
reasoning about variable and field independences, perhaps using a higher order version of the frame rule [25]. We
would also like to explore, via abstract interpretation and perhaps following Schmidt’s development [32], whether our
Hoare-like logic is the “best” possible one with respect to the underlying abstract interpretation.
Note added in print. In work subsequent to this article [2], we have extended the framework to handle modular
reasoning about information flow in an object-oriented language. Thus we have addressed one of the future goals
mentioned in the conclusion of this article. Also, in a forthcoming paper, Hunt and Sands [19] discuss a flow sensitive
security type system for a simple imperative language. They show that their flow sensitive security type system is
equivalent to the logic of independences discussed in the conference version of this paper [4].
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